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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' to end employment prac-
tices that discriminate on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
2
Congress intended the Act to apply to corporations and businesses engaged in commerce
in the United States.' However, an American corporation that is the wholly owned sub-
sidiary4 of a foreign company may not be subject to title VII claims by executive
employees if a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN treaty) exists between
the United States and the foreign country.5 In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
foreign-owned subsidiaries incorporated in the United States are generally not entities
covered by an FCN itreaty.6 However, in a footnote, the Court suggested that under some
circumstances, these subsidiaries may invoke the FCN treaty rights of their parent
companies.7 To date, the Court has not declared what those circumstances might be.
More recently, however, in Fortino v. Quasar Co.,' the Seventh Circuit allowed
Quasar Company, a subsidiary incorporated in the United States and wholly owned by a
Japanese firm, to invoke the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty (Japan FCN Treaty)9 rights of its
parent company to defeat a title VII discrimination claim brought by three American
executive employees.'0 This case is the first to hold that a foreign-owned, U.S. corpora-
tion has a right conferred by an FCN treaty to discriminate against its American employ-
ees. Under Fortino, American-owned corporations in the United States have essentially
fewer rights than their foreign-owned counterparts.
The Fortino case is extremely important because it creates uncertainty among the
federal circuit courts in an area of law Where many individuals are affected. Furthermore,
since the parties in Fortino have settled and will not be filing for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court," there will continue to be a period of uncertainty on the FCN treaty-title
VII issue for the parties in employment discrimination suits. Courts will need to decide
whether to follow Fortino's analysis of the interaction between FCN treaty rights and the
civil rights in title VII.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1993).
2. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See discussion infra part II.B (discussing title VII).
3. Id. §§ 2000e(a) to (b). Title VII generally applies to businesses affecting interstate commerce
which have fifteen or more employees. Id. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
4. In this Note, unless otherwise indicated, the term "subsidiary" generally refers to a corporation in-
corporated in the United States that is owned by a foreign parent company.
5. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). Many FCN treaties provide that businesses
of the foreign country may hire executives "of their choice." E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. VIII, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070 [hereinafter Japan FCN Treaty].
See infra note 31 and accompanying text (listing some of the nations that have FCN treaties with the U.S.
containing an "of their choice" provision). Fortino held that the "of their choice" language provides U.S.
incorporated subsidiaries of foreign companies a defense to title VII. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393. See discus-
sion infra parts I.A, II.B, III (discussing the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty, title VII, and the Fortino decision).
6. Sumitomo Shcji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982).
7. Id. at 189 n.19.
8. 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
9. Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 5.
10. Id. at 393.
11. Thomas J. Piskorski, Fortino v. Quasar Co.: Are Japanese-Owned Companies Immune from Title
VII?, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 61, 70 (1992).
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The problem is particularly alarming due to the increasing number of foreign firms
establishing subsidiaries in the United States. 2 Many people have focused special atten-
tion on Japanese subsidiaries because of the large number of these subsidiaries and the
numerous discrimination allegations made by American employees at these firms.13 At
Japanese subsidiaries, many employees have found an environment of discriminatory
hiring and promotion practices. 4 This discrimination has usually been based either on
gender 5 or lack of Japanese nationality. 6 In a 1990 survey of 585 U.S. subsidiaries
of Japanese firms, thirty percent reported that they had been accused by their employees
of discriminatory practices. 7 Because the number of positions at Japanese firms in the
United States has steadily increased and is expected to continue to increase, 18 the number
of discrimination claims is also likely to grow.
This Note examines the Fortino v. Quasar Co. decision. Part II analyzes the provi-
sions of FCN treaties and title VII and court decisions affecting foreign-owned U.S.
subsidiaries.'9 Part III summarizes the facts of Fortino and reviews the district and
appellate court decisions. 20 Part IV discusses the legal ramifications of this decision on
future title VII actions and on American employees of foreign-owned subsidiaries in the
United States.2' Finally, Part V suggests an approach for reconciling the Japan FCN
Treaty and title VII?2
1[. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This section analyzes those provisions of the Japan FCN Treaty and title VII affecting
Japanese-owned U.S. subsidiaries. In addition, this section examines the court decisions
12. See. e.g., Ronald E. Yates, A Collision of Corporate Cultures-Bias Charges Grow at Japanese
Firms in U.S., CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1992, Business, at 1.
13. Eileen M. Mullen, Note, Rotating Japanese Managers in American Subsidiaries of Japanese
Firms: A Challenge for American Employment Discrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 725, 726-58 (1993)
(discussing in detail the allegations of discrimination at Japanese fimis and typical justifications for these
practices); Yates, supra note 12. Currently, there are more than 2000 Japanese subsidiaries in the United
States, which employ over 400,000 Americans. Id.
14. Mullen, supra note 13, at 726-40; Yates, supra note 12. The Employment and Housing Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Government Operations has heard many complaints of discrimination
from many displeased American employees at Japanese companies. Id. An aide on the House subcommit-
tee acknowledged that there has been a pattern of complaints against Japanese firms regarding sexual harass-
ment and discrimination based on race and gender. Id.
15. See Dana Marie Crom, Comment, Clash of the Cultures: U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Title
VII, and Women in Management, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 337 (1990) (discussing gender discrimination for
managerial positions at Japanese firms in the United States in the context of title VII and the Japan FCN
Treaty).
16. Yates, supra note 12.
17. Id.
18. Estimates are that the number of Americans who work for Japanese firms in the United States
will increase to one million by the year 2000. Sully Taylor, American Managers in Japanese Subsidiaries,
PAC. NoRTHwEsT ExEcUTnv, July 1990, at 22. See Yates, supra note 12, at 1.
19. See infra notes 23-104 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 105-68 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 169-96 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
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that had considered the FCN treaty-title VII issue before the Seventh Circuit decided
Fortino.
A. The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
The United Stales entered into its first amity and commerce treaty, of which the FCN
treaty is the most modem form, with France in 1778, and thereafter entered similar trea-
ties with other nations throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.' After
World War II, the United States entered into FCN treaties with a series of nations in order
to promote private international commerce.24
Since the first such treaty in 1778, the goal of an FCN treaty has been to establish
or confirm that the governmental policy in the host country is one of equity and hospi-
tality to the private foreign investor.' The enterprise and property of aliens is respected
and granted the same legal protections that are enjoyed by citizens of the host country.26
In essence, an FCN treaty is the medium through which nations seek to secure the recip-
rocal respect for their private interests abroad according to agreed rules of law.
In 1953, the United States entered into an FCN treaty with Japan. 28 At the time the
Japan FCN Treaty was signed, Japan had recently been defeated in World War II and the
23. E.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, 8 Slat. 12 (1778), Treaty of Amity, Commerce
and Navigation with Great Britain, 8 Slat. 116 (1794); Treaty with Sweden, 8 Slat. 232 (1816); Treaty with
the King of the Netherlands, 8 Stat. 524 (1839); Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Belgium, 8 Slat.
606 (1845); Treaty with the Kingdom of Italy, 17 Slat. 845 (1871); Agreement-Spain, 23 Slat. 750 (1884);
Convention-Germany, 31 Slat. 1935 (1900); Treaty-China, 33 Slat. 2208 (1903). See also Herman Walk-
er, Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Comnercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 374 (1956)
[hereinafter Walker, Conmmercial Treaties]; Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805, 805 n.4 (1958) [hereinafter Walker, Modern Treaties]. Herman
Walker was the primary architect of the postwar FCN treaties. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457
U.S. 176, 181 n.6 (citing Department of State Airgram A-105, dated Jan. 9, 1976).
24. Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 230-31 (1956) [hereinafter Walker, United States
Practice]; Walker, Commercial Treaties, supra note 23, at 374-75; Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 23,
at 809. Between 1946 and 1956, the United States signed substantially similar FCN treaties with 16 nations:
Republic of China (Taiwan), 1946; Italy, 1948; Uruguay, 1949; Ireland, 1950; Columbia, 1951; Ethiopia,
1951; Israel, 1951; Greece, 1951; Denmark, 1951; Japan, 1953; Federal Republic of Germany (West Germa-
ny), 1954; Haiti, 1955; Iran, 1955; Nicaragua, 1956; Netherlands, 1956; and South Korea, 1956. Id. at 805
n.4.
25. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 24, at 230-31. The preamble of the Japan FCN Treaty
states its purpose is to strengthen "bonds of peace and friendship" between the two nations and to encourage
"closer economic and cultural relations between" the people. Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 5, pmbl., 4
U.S.T. at 2066.
26. Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 5, 4 U.S.T. at 2069. Article VII(l) states: "Nationals and
companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of
commercial, industrial, financial and other business activities within the territories of the other Party." Id.
See Walker, United States Practice, supra note 24, at 230; Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 23, at 805.
27. Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 23, at 805.
28. Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 5, 4 U.S.T. at 2063. By 1993, the United States had similar
treaties with approximately 50 nations. Yates, supra note 12. This Note focuses heavily on the Japan FCN
Treaty because this was the subject of the Fortino decision. However, the Fortino decision probably extends
to subsidiaries of parent companies from nations other than Japan as long as an FCN treaty with the United
States is involved and the treaty contains the "of their choice" provision.
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United States was in a predominant position in the world. The United States used its
superior bargaining position during the postwar period to enter into many FCN treaties
to protect American foreign investments. 29 During the Japan FCN Treaty negotiations,
the negotiators probably did not envision that Japanese-owned subsidiaries would be
asserting their Treaty rights in the United States some thirty years later.'
Article VIII(1) of the Japan FCN Treaty states: "Nationals and companies of either
Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants
and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of
their choice."
31
During the Japan FCN Treaty negotiations, it was the United States that insisted on
this "of their choice" provision, while Japan opposed it.32 This provision allows com-
panies of either nation to hire employees "of their choice" for the positions enumerated
in the Treaty, which includes "executive" employees.33 The provision has stirred much
debate and litigation over whether it actually confers upon foreign-owned, U.S. subsidi-
aries a right to discriminate against American employees.'
When determining whether an FCN treaty right was exercised properly, a court will
initially inquire whether an individual is an executive as contemplated by the FCN treaty.
In making this determination, a court considers the issuance of a treaty trader visa, also
known as an E visa, to an employee as strong evidence that the employee is covered by
the treaty.35 The U.S. State Department will grant treaty trader visas only to persons
29. Robert Abraham, Limitations on the Right of Japanese Employers to Select Employees of Their
Choice Under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 6 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 475, 490
(1991). See also supra note 24 (listing 16 FCN treaties the United States entered into between 1946 and
1956).
30. See Abraham, supra note 29.
31. Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. at 2070 (emphasis added). Many
other nations have bilateral FCN treaties with the U.S. containing an "of their choice" provision. See, e.g.,
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951 and Dec. 26, 1951, U.S.-Greece, art. XII,
para. 4, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1857, 1859; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, U.S.-
Korea, art. VIII, para. 1, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2223; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4,
1946, U.S.-Taiwan, art. II1, para. 3, 63 Stat. 1299, 1302-03; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, art. 1, para. 2(c), 63 Stat. 2255, 2258. See also supra note 24 and accompanying
text (listing 16 FCN treaties the United States entered into between 1946 and 1956). In many of the FCN
treaties, the "of their choice" provision is found in article VIII, paragraph 1. See Walker, Modern Treaties,
supra note 23, at 807-08.
32. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 181 n.6 (1982), cited in Fortino v. Quasar
Co., 950 F.2d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1991).
33. Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
34. E.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); MacNamara v. Korean Air
Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr.
1981); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th
Cir. 1991). See also discussion infra part II.C (discussing the judicial attempts to reconcile the "of their
choice" provision and title VII).
35. See, e.g., MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding
that an employee was an executive covered under an FCN treaty primarily because the employee was issued
an E-1 visa); Fortino, 950 F.2d at 389, 392 (concluding that the parent company's proper exercise of its
FCN treaty right to assign its own executives was further confirmed by the issuance of E-I and E-2 visas).
In an amicus curiae brief filed in Fortino, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) disputed the argument that all rights flow from the Treaty simply because an individual possesses a
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who qualify as executives under the "of their choice" provision of an FCN treaty.36 The
State Department guidelines provide that for treaty trader status, the person must be plan-
ning to engage in duties of a "supervisory or executive character," or have special qualifi-
cations that make his services essential to the enterprise.37
A court's next inquiry is whether the entity claiming an FCN Treaty right is a com-
pany of the other nation. This issue is the subject of the Fortino decision 38 and was
considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano.3 9
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress intended title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to end discriminatory
employment practices with regard to an "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."'  Title VII applies to employers of fifteen or more employees engaged in inter-
state commerce in the United States.41 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
treaty trader visa. Scott Mozarsky, Comment, Defining Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin Un-
der Article VI(1) of the Friendship Treaty Between the United States and Japan, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1099, 1124 (1991-92). To support its contention, the EEOC suggested that E visas may be issued to a
broader class of employees than those identified in article VIII(l); for example, employees of a U.S. com-
pany may obtain visas if a Japanese company owns more than 50% of the company. Id. at 1 125. However,
according to Article VII, a company is covered under the Japan FCN Treaty if a Japanese business has a
majority interest in that company. Id. Therefore, the Japan FCN Treaty does permit the situation that the
EEOC believed overbroad and this argument is probably invalid. Id. at 1126.
36. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(E) (1993). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) governs
treaty trader visa issuance. Id. § 1101. An alien is allowed entry into the United States under the provisions
of an FCN treaty between the U.S. and foreign nation either to (1) solely carry on substantial trade between
the U.S. and other nation or (2) solely develop and direct an enterprise in which he has, or is in the process
of making, a substantial investment. Id. § I 101(a)(15)(E).
37. 22 C.F.R. § 41A40(a) (1987). In common usage, "executive, often refers to a person in upper
level management. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 569 (6th ed. 1990). However, under § 41.40(a), the State
Department considers a person in a managerial role to be an "executive." Significantly, according to this
scheme, people may be classified as executives even if their positions are not particularly high in the hier-
archy of the business.
38. See discussion infra part III (discussing the Fortino decision).
39. 457 U.S. 176 (1982). See discussion infra part II.C.1 (discussing the Sunitono decision).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1993). The provision states:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
Id. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l) to (2).
41. Id §§ 2000e(a) to (b). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to an employer, who is a person
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year[.l" Id. § 2000e(b). The
term "person" includes "one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions,
labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock
companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, [and] tnistees[.]" Id. § 2000e(a).
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(EEOC) is the agency charged with enforcing title VII and investigates and prosecutes
alleged violations filed by employees.42
Congress's objective for title VII was "to insure the complete and full enjoyment by
all persons of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by the Consti-
tution., 43 Courts have generally construed title VII liberally because of Congress's broad
intent to end all remnants of discrimination in the American workplace.
44
Title VII makes no reference to FCN treaties.45 Title VII is also silent as to whether
it can be applied to foreign companies doing business in the United States. 46 Further,
the U.S. Supreme Court has not had occasion to determine whether Congress intended
title VII to apply to foreign companies in the United States. However, due to its broad
construction of title VII in the past, the Court will likely find that title VII does apply to
foreign companies in the United States.
4 7
1. Distinction Between National Origin and Citizenship
Title VII prohibits employment practices having the purpose or effect of discriminat-
ing on the basis of national origin. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Espinoza
v. Farah Manufacturing CO. 4 9 that title VII does not extend to discrimination on the
basis of "citizenship."5 The Espinoza Court distinguished national origin, which refers
42. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a)(2), 1606.4 (1982).
43. Ward v. W & H Voortman, 685 F. Supp. 231, 232 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (citing H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2402).
44. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (finding that Congress's
intent for title VII was the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment); Ward v.
W & H Voortman, 685 F. Supp. 231, 232 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (concluding that Congress had a broad purpose
to end all vestiges of employment discrimination); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 586 (11 th Cir.
1984) (construing liberally the definition of employer in title VII); Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union,
617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980) (construing liberally the definition of employer in title VII).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1993).
46. Id.
47. See Crom, supra note 15, at 347 (finding that the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the
purpose of title VII is to remove discriminatory barriers to employment, which has resulted in a broad
reading of title VII).
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to provide that title VII applies to Americans working
for U.S. corporations abroad. Jacqueline E. Bailey, Note, Title VII Protections Do Not Extend to Americans
Working Overseas. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991)., 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 417,
442-44 (1992) (discussing the Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco) decision, its ramifications, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was specifically designed to reverse the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Aramco so that title VII applies to Americans working in U.S. companies abroad. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1993).
49. 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding that an employer's policy against hiring aliens did not violate title
VII).
50. Id. at 88. After reviewing the legislative record, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the term
"national origin" in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to mean the country froh which a person or his
forbears came. Id. at 89. The Court further supported its holding by finding that because "ancestry" was
deleted from the final version of the Act, Congress must have considered ancestry and national origin
synonymous. Id.
Although not covered by title VII, discrimination on the basis of citizenship may be illegal under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a) (1993). For a discussion of the conflict
caused by Fortino regarding the IRCA and Japan FCN Treaty, see Angelo A. Paparelli et al., The Quasar
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to the country front which one's ancestors came, from citizenship.5 Specifically, the
Court noted that a person's ancestors do not necessarily come from the place where the
person is a citizen." Still, citizenship may not be used as a pretext to discriminate on
the basis of national origin.
53
Unlike U.S. citizens, who have diverse ethnic backgrounds, the citizens of Japan are
predominantly of the same race.' Any discrimination by Japanese companies on the
basis of national origin can be easily characterized as discrimination on the basis of citi-
zenship.55 Thus, foreign companies can attempt to avoid title VII by arguing that they
are preferring Japanese citizens when they are in fact discriminating against Americans
for racial reasons.
2. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception
Title VII has a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception which allows
an employer to legally discriminate in cases where it is "reasonably necessary" for busi-
ness operations5 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed that the BFOQ exception is
meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination. 7
When applied to a foreign company, the BFOQ exception takes into consideration
factors that are unique to doing business within a given culture. In the case of a Japa-
nese corporation, these factors may include a person's (1) knowledge of the Japanese
Case: Hidden Problemns of Employment, hImigration, and Tar Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 1037, 1052-54 (1992)
(concluding that future litigation is necessary to determine whether the IRCA prohibits discrimination in
favor of foreign nationals at foreign-owned subsidiaries). See also Abraham, supra note 29, at 521 (con-
cluding that Congress probably intended for the IRCA to prevail over an FCN treaty).
51. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88. The Supreme Court found no legislative history suggesting that Con-
gress intended to overturn its longstanding practice of permitting discrimination on the basis of citizenship
for federal employees. Id. at 89-90.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 92. The Court reaffirmed the holding of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers practices that are discriminatory in operation, as well as ovcrt
discrimination. Id.
54. Quasar Lawyers Cite Reciprocal Benefits of Decision on Preference for Japanese, BNA INT'L
Bus. DAiLY, Dec. 17, 1991. Japan is a homogeneous nation; its citizens are almost exclusively native-born
Japanese. Id.
55. Id. (discussing the ease with which Japanese firms can disguise national origin discrimination as
citizenship discrimination). See also Jeffrey J. Mayer, A Critical Analysis of Judicial Attempts to Reconcile
the United States-Japan Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty with Title VII, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 328, 343 (1992) (concluding that no meaningful difference exists between the preference for Japanese
citizens and discrimination against Americans).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1993). This provision states:
[lit shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees
... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise ....
Id § 2000e-2(e)(1).
57. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991) (interpreting the BFOQ exception at length). See
EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a), 1606.4 (1982) (providing that the BFOQ exception should be
interpreted narrowly).
58. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1139 (3d Cir. 1988).
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language and culture; (2) knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and business
practices; (3) familiarity with the personnel and inner workings of the parent company in
Japan; and (4) acceptability by those with whom the company transacts business.
9
Japanese companies can claim the BFOQ exception applies when a position requires
an employee to speak Japanese or know the business practices, culture, and customs of
Japan in order to coordinate with the home office in Japan. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not specifically decided this issue.
60
C. Judicial Attempts to Reconcile the "of Their Choice" Provision and Title VII
Because title VII is silent as to whether it preempts the "of their choice" provision
of an FCN treaty,6 there can be a conflict if a foreign company exercises its FCN right
by employing executives of its choice and also discriminates on any basis covered by title
VII-race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Other unresolved issues include the
scope of the rights conferred by an FCN treaty and whether a foreign-owned subsidiary
can assert these rights.
The court decisions that had considered the FCN treaty and title VII issue prior to the
Seventh Circuit decision in Fortino were the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano and appellate decisions in the Third, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits.62 Generally, courts have avoided finding that title VII and the Japan FCN
Treaty conflict.63
1. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Sumitomo Decision
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,4 the U.S. Supreme Court was faced
with the issue of whether the Japan FCN Treaty could be used by a U.S. subsidiary of a
Japanese company as a defense against a title VII civil rights discrimination claim.
65
However, instead of addressing that issue, the Court held that the Japanese-owned U.S.
59. Id.
60. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 n.19 (1982). The U.S. Supreme
Court expressed no view as to whether Japanese citizenship may provide a basis for a BFOQ exception. Id.
However, the Court recognized that some positions at Japanese-owned U.S. subsidiaries may require
knowledge of the Japanese language, culture, and business practices. Id. For an analysis of the Sumitomo
decision, see discussion infra part II.C. I.
61. See discussion supra parts II.A, I.B (discussing the Japan FCN Treaty and title VII).
62. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines,
863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981);
Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
63. The court cases which have considered the issue have generally involved claims of national origin
discrimination. The courts were often able to avoid a clash between the FCN treaty and title VII by drawing
a distinction between discrimination based on national origin and citizenship, which is not prohibited by title
VII. It may be harder for a court to draw this distinction when the discrimination claims are on the basis of
gender.
64. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
65. Id. at 179. This is the same issue that was presented in Fortino. See discussion infra part III
(discussing the Fortino decision).
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subsidiary could not properly raise any FCN rights because it did not come within the
coverage of the Treaty.6
In Sumitomo, American female secretarial employees 67 brought a class action suit
against their employer, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. (Sumitomo), a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Sumitomo Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, a Japanese trading company.6 The com-
plaint alleged Sumitomo's practice of favoring Japanese males for executive, managerial,
and sales positions violated title VII's prohibitions against gender and national origin dis-
crimination.' In its defense, Sumitomo claimed article VIII(l) of the Japan FCN Treaty
allowed it to choose "executive personnel ... of their choice." 70
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger found that according to its lan-
guage, the Japan FCN Treaty only covers "companies of Japan."'" The Court adopted
a place-of-incorporation test to determine the nationality of corporations under the
Treaty.72 Since Surnitomo was incorporated and operated in the United States, it was
not a company of Japan.73 As such, Sumitomo could not invoke the Japan FCN
Treaty.74 In amicus curiae briefs, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 75 and
the U.S. Department of State agreed that a U.S. corporation, even when wholly owned by
a Japanese company, is not a company of Japan under the Japan FCN Treaty.76
Since Sumitomo was not covered by the Japan FCN Treaty, the Court had no occa-
sion to resolve the conflict between article VIII(l) and title VII. However, the Court
declared in dicta that the purpose of an FCN treaty was not to give foreign corporations
greater rights than domestic companies, but instead, to assure them the right to conduct
business on an equal basis without suffering discrimination based on their alienage.
77
In footnote 19, the Court left open the possibility that a foreign-owned subsidiary could
assert the FCN treaty rights of its parent.78
66. lt at 182-83.
67. One of the plaintiffs was a Japanese citizen living in the United States. Id. at 178.
68. Id.
69. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In the lower
courts, "Avagliano" was misspelled as "Avigliano."
70. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 179 (1982); Japan FCN Treaty, supra note
5, 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
71. Id. at 180-82.
72. Id. at 182-85.
73. Id. at 182-83, 188-89.
74. Id. at 182-83, 189.
75. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the office of the government of Japan that is responsible for
the interpretation of the "Japan FCN Treaty. Stunitonzo, 457 U.S. at 183.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 187-88.
78. Id. at 189-90 n.19. The Court stated that it "express[ed] no view as to whether Sumitomo may
assert any Article VIiII) rights of its parent" Id.
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2. The Circuit Courts
Before the Fortino decision, the Fifth, Sixth, and Third Circuits had considered the
rights which an FCN treaty confers, each reaching differing conclusions.79
a. The Fifth Circuit
Prior to Sumitomo, in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.,8w the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had determined that the Japan FCN Treaty conferred a complete immunity to
Japanese-owned subsidiaries incorporated in the United States from title VII.8 I However,
after Sumitomo, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded Spiess.82
On remand, the Fifth Circuit followed Sumitomo and dismissed the case because the
defendant, C. Itoh America, was a corporation of the United States, and as such could not
properly raise the Japan FCN Treaty.8 3 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit rejected C. Itoh
America's attempt to assert its parent's FCN treaty rights:' "'The defendant, by con-
tending that it has standing to assert the substantive treaty rights of its parent, is
attempting to accomplish indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly. The Court does
not believe that either the Treaty or the Sumitomo case would permit that to occur."'
85
As a result, the Fifth Circuit held C. Itoh America was subject to title VII despite the
"of their choice" provision of the Japan FCN Treaty and footnote 19 of Sumitomo.
8 6
b. The Sixth Circuit
In Wickes v. Olympic Airways,7 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
an FCN treaty allows foreign entities only a "narrow privilege" to discriminate in favor
of their own citizens.
88
In Wickes, the plaintiff, an American citizen, was district sales manager for Olympic
Airways, a foreign corporation 9 owned by the government of Greece.90 When the
79. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.),
643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984). The
Ninth Circuit has not addressed the FCN treaty issue, but will probably have the opportunity to do so in the
near future. For a discussion of the developments in the district courts in the Ninth Circuit, see discussion
infra part IV.C.
80. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.). 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
81. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 358. In Spiess, the complaint charged that C. Itoh-America had discriminated
against its American employees by making managerial promotions and other benefits available only to Japa-
nese citizens. Id. at 355. C. Itoh-America is a subsidiary incorporated in New York, wholly owned by C.
Itoh & Co., a Japanese corporation. Id.
82. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
83. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970, 972-73 (1984).
84. Id.
85. Id. (favorably quoting the district court).
86. Id. at 971-73. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing footnote 19).
87. 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
88. Id. at 368.
89. Olympic Airways was not incorporated within the United States. Id. at 364.
90. Id.
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plaintiff was dismissed, he brought a discrimination suit under a Michigan civil rights
statute substantially similar to title VII.9' Olympic Airways argued that the U.S.-Greece
FCN Treaty immunized it from all employment discrimination claims.9 The lower court
agreed, interpreting the "of their choice" language as conferring upon the foreign corpora-
tion an absolute right to discriminate against non-Greek citizens.93 Therefore, the plain-
tiffs claim was barred as a matter of law.
94
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit held that the FCN treaty right only extends to
those who are executive personnel as defined under the FCN treaty and outlined by the
State Department's rules for issuing treaty trader visas.9' The Sixth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case to consider whether the plaintiffs position was covered by the FCN
treaty.
96
c. The Third Circuit
In MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines,97 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that an FCN treaty will not shield a foreign company from title VII liability for
discriminating on the basis of national origin.9 However, the court also concluded that
a foreign-owned subsidiary may exercise its FCN treaty rights and discriminate on the
basis of citizenship in executive positions without violating title VII. 99
The Third Circuit acknowledged that because of the homogeneous nature of the popu-
lation in many foreign countries, a foreign-owned subsidiary exercising its FCN treaty
right would appear to violate title VII.0 Therefore, according to the court, these title
VII suits could not be brought based merely upon an allegation that an employer's con-
duct resulted in a discriminatory effect.1 'O To alleviate this problem, the court required
that some evidence of the employer's actual discriminatory motive must be alleged.
0 2
This motive may be: shown by introducing evidence of statistical disparities suggesting
discriminatory conduct. 10 3 The court reasoned that this would allow plaintiffs to bring
title VII actions without unfairly burdening a company from exercising its "of their
choice" treaty right."°
91. Id.
92. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 364.
93. Id. at 365.
94. id.
95. Id. at 368-69. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing treaty trader visas).
96. Id. at 368.
97. 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
98. Id. at 1147. In MacNamara, an American district sales manager for Korean Air Lines, a Korean
company, was replaced by a Korean citizen. Id. at 1137-38. The plaintiff claimed a violation of title VII,
while the Korean company invoked the U.S.-Korea FCN Treaty. Id.
99. Id. at 1146-47.
100. Id. at 1148.
101. Id. This theory of recovery, which relies on the discriminatory effect of the employer's conduct,
is referred to as the "disparate impact" liability theory. See id.
102. MacNamara, .863 F.2d at 1148. A suit based upon an allegation of the employer's discriminatory
motive is referred to as a "discriminatory treatment case." See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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III. THE CASE
A. The Facts
In 1985, the plaintiffs, John Fortino, Carl Meyers, and F. William Schulz,'0 5 were
employed by Quasar Company (Quasar). t°6 Fortino was Assistant General Manager of
the Advertising, Sales Promotions and Public Relations Department;'0 7 Meyers was
Manager of Sales Administration; 8 and Schulz was National Manager of Physical Dis-
tribution. °9 All plaintiffs were native-born Americans."0 Quasar considered the
plaintiffs excellent employees and had given them good performance evaluations, regular
promotions, and steady pay increases."t
Quasar was a division of a U.S. corporation, Matsushita Electric Corporation of
America (Matsushita), which was a wholly owned subsidiary of Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Company, Ltd. (MED, a Japanese company." 2  Quasar did not manufacture the
products it sold, but purchased them from MEl." 3  Quasar maintained an affirmative
action program which required it not to discriminate on the basis of national origin." 4
In 1985, Quasar had an operating loss of approximately $20 million." 5 To prevent
future losses, Kiyoshi Seki, Matsushita's president, and Mr. Tami, MEI's president, dis-
cussed reorganizing Quasar, including the appointment of a new executive vice president,
Kenichi Nishikawa." 6 In March 1986, MEI sent Nishikawa from Japan to manage
Quasar."7  In April and May, 1986, Nishikawa reorganized the company and reduced
the workforce.1
8
105. Sophie Mustachio was also a plaintiff at the district court level. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F.
Supp. 1306, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1990). However, her claim was for discrimination on the basis of age in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 631. Id. She had voluntarily dis-
missed her claim of discrimination on the basis of national origin. Id. She was not a party in the Seventh
Circuit. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d. 389, 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
106. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1308-09.
107. Id. at 1308.
108. Id. at 1309.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1308-10.
111. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1308-11. Fortino had been employed by Quasar for 10 years. Id. at
1308. Meyers had been employed by Quasar for nine years. Id. at 1309. Schulz had been employed by
Quasar for 29 years. Id.
112. Id. at 1307. Matsushita is incorporated in Delaware. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1308. Matsushita
purchased Quasar from Motorola, an American corporation, in 1974. Id. Quasar's principal place of busi-
ness and headquarters is in Franklin Park, Illinois. Id.
113. Jd at 1308.
114. Id. at 1313-14.
115. Id. at 1309.
116. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1309. The district court did not elaborate greatly on either the scope or
depth of these discussions.
117. Id. at 1309-10.
118. Id. at 1311.
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MEI occasionally assigned some of its own financial and marketing executives,
referred to as "expatriates,"" 9 from Japan to Quasar on a temporary basis. 2 ' At the
time of the 1986 workforce reduction, Quasar employed ten managerial employees from
MEI of Japanese national origin, including Nishikawa.'' The expatriates entered the
United States on E-type temporary visas and were designated as MEI personnel in
Quasar's books."' MEI evaluated the expatriates' performance, kept their personnel
records, determined their salaries, and aided in the relocation of their families.'
However, they were paid by Quasar. 24 Quasar conceded it used a different salary
structure for managerial employees of Japanese national origin from that for
Americans."
The plaintiffs were discharged as part of the May 1986 workforce reduction and were
not offered any other positions within the company. 2 6 In addition, Quasar fired sixty-
six managers of American national origin; however, none of the expatriates were dis-
charged.27  Instead, all the expatriates received salary increases.1 28  Believing they
119. Expatriation usually refers to voluntarily renouncing or abandoning one's country to become the
citizen of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990). However, in Fortino, "expatriates" has
an entirely different meaning. These expatriates enter the United States temporarily using E visas. Fortino,
751 F. Supp. at 1310. They do not become U.S. citizens, but retain Japanese citizenship. Fortino, 950 F.2d
at 392.
120. Fortino, 950 "F.2d at 392.
121. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1310.
122. Id. at 1310-11; Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392.
123. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392.
124. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1311.
125. Id. Japanese managers' salaries were adjusted using the following factors: (1) whether the
employee lives in an apartment or owns a home; (2) the size of the employee's family; and, (3) whether the
employee's children attend public or private school. Id. See infra note 128 and accompanying text (listing
the salary schedules for :everal of Quasar's expatriates).
126. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1308-09. Without advance notice, Fortino was dismissed because his
advertising department was being eliminated. Id. at 1312. Eventually, Fortino became a sales representative
for Spectrum Graphics. Id. at 1313. His earnings were $1200 in 1987 and $11,000 in 1988. Id. Similarly,
Meyers was dismissed because his job function was eliminated. Id. Meyers asked to be transferred to
another position and told Quasar he was willing to take any position within the organization. Id. Although
capable of performing in many of the positions held by the expatriate managers, Meyers was not offered any
other position. Id. After his dismissal, Meyers contacted 300-400 executive search companies. Id. How-
ever, he was only able to obtain temporary positions with companies such as H & R Block during the tax
season. Id. He was unemployed at the time of trial. Id. Schulz was dismissed and not offered any other
position because, according to Quasar, he was overqualified for many of the "new" positions created by the
reorganization. Id. Schulz attempted to find new employment through an oulplacement firm, sending out
3300 resumes, but he was unable to find a position. Id. Eventually, he purchased a hardware store but had
not realized any profits by the time of trial. Id.
127. Id. at 1312; Joseph M. Winski, Japanese Companies Cited in Other Discrimination Complaints,
ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 22, 1993, at 18. Two of three Japanese-American nonexecutive employees were
among those who were discharged. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392.
128. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1311-12. Immediately preceding and continuing through the workforce
reduction, Quasar increased the salaries of its ten managerial employees of Japanese national origin. Id. at
1312. The salary schedule of several of these employees is as follows: Tasuka Ikeda: Sept. 1986, $70,476;
Apr. 1987, $71,436; Sept. 1987, $76,776; Moritaka Saigusa: Apr. 1986, $84,516; Apr. 1987, $85,816; and
Kenichi Nishikawa: Sept. 1986, $63,300; Sept. 1987, $67,860. Id. Moreover, before the workforce reduc-
tion, when Quasar was losing money "hand over fist," two expatriates received substantial increases. Id. at
1311. From May 1984 to July 1984, Ikeda's salary increased from $37,200 to $56,640. Id. From October
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had been unfairly discriminated against, the plaintiffs filed discrimination charges against
Quasar with the EEOC.129 In March 1987, the EEOC issued "right to sue" letters, and
in May 1987, the plaintiffs brought a title VII action against Quasar for national origin
discrimination.13
0
B. The District Court Opinion
In December 1990, the district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.13 '
The court found as a matter of law that Quasar impermissibly discriminated against the
plaintiffs by discharging them solely on the basis of their American national origin.1
3
1
Applying the Sumitomo place-of-incorporation test, the court easily found that Quasar, a
division of a Delaware corporation, was a U.S. company.' 33 Thus, Quasar was obligated
to comply with American employment discrimination laws.'
3
The plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case of
national origin discrimination by showing that managerial employees of American national
origin were adversely affected by the Quasar workforce reduction, but those of Japanese
origin were not. 3  To rebut this, Quasar claimed it had discharged the plaintiffs
because (1) its dire financial condition necessitated the dismissals and (2) the ability to
speak Japanese was necessary to perform in those positions reserved for the managerial
employees of Japanese origin.'36 However, the plaintiffs were successful in establishing
that the proffered reasons were merely pretextual by showing that Quasar had segregated
its workforce along the lines of national origin. 37 Notably, in the district court, Quasar
did not claim any defense based on the "of their choice" provision of the Japan FCN
Treaty.
38
In its conclusions of law, the district court found that Quasar had used discriminatory
practices when it reserved managerial positions for employees of Japanese origin, evalu-
ated and paid its managers of Japanese origin on entirely different criteria from those of
American origin, and exempted those of Japanese origin from the workforce reduction,
all without any lawful justification. 39 Furthermore, the court declared that Quasar acted
1985 to April 1986, Akira Mishima's salary increased from $41,600 to $68,160. Id.
129. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1308-11, 1314.
130. Id. at 1307, 1314.
131. Id. at 1316.
132. Id.
133. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1315 (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1314-16.
136. Id. at 1315.
137. Id. The plaintiffs could demonstrate that Quasar's reasons were pretextual in one of two ways by
showing that (1) the discriminatory motive more likely than not motivated Quasar's action, or (2) Quasar's
proffered explanations were not credible. Id. At trial, the plaintiffs also showed that in the past, many
managerial employees of American national origin, who did not speak Japanese, performed the managerial
duties which Quasar contended could only be performed by employees of Japanese national origin. Id. at
1316. These duties included traveling to Japan and communicating with employees in Japanese. Id.
138. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391.
139. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1315.
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in "reckless disregard of the law in its treatment of the plaintiffs" because Quasar had
knowledge of its legal obligations by maintaining its affirmative action program. 4 In
the end, the court ruled that Quasar had violated title VII by depriving the plaintiffs of
employment opportunities based solely on their national origin and awarded the plaintiffs
$2.5 million in damages.'4'
C. The Court of Appeals Opinion
Quasar appealed the district court decision, and in December 1991, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.'42 In an opinion written by Circuit Judge
Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that the Japan FCN Treaty permitted Quasar to
discriminate on the basis of citizenship for managerial employees in executive positions
without violating title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.143 Quasar could rely on the
Japan FCN Treaty by invoking the treaty rights of its Japanese parent, MEL.1
44
Ordinarily, when an issue is not raised at the district court level, that issue cannot be
considered later on appeal. 145 Although Quasar did not claim its Japan FCN Treaty
rights in the district court, the Seventh Circuit allowed Quasar to raise the issue for ihe
"sake of international comity, amity, and commerce ... when ... consider[ing] the
bearing of a major treaty with a major power and principal ally of the United States.' 46
As a further justification, the court analogized to the comity between the federal govern-
ment and states which allows courts to consider issues that otherwise would have been
waived if not raised below.
47
The Seventh Circuit found that the expatriates were executives as contemplated by
the Japan FCN Treaty primarily because they had been issued E visas.'48 Other reasons
included that they had remained employees of MEI while at Quasar, performed work that
was executive or supervisory in character, were Japanese citizens, worked for a company
in the United States that was "at least half owned by Japanese nationals," and were doing
work authorized under the FCN Treaty.
4 9
Turning to the question of discrimination, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court that in Quasar's 1986 workforce reduction, the company did favor Japanese execu-
tives over managers of American national origin.'5 However, the court also found that
the favoritism toward the expatriates was not the same as national origin discrimination
140. Id. at 1314.
141. Id. at 1315; Stephanie B. Goldberg, Firing Line-Treaty Limits Title Vll Actions Against Foreign.
Owned Companies, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 72.
142. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 399.
143. Id. at 391-92.
144. ld. at 393.
145. Id. at 391 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976)).
146. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391.
147. Id. (citing Younger v. Harris. 401 U.S. 37, 40 (1971)). The Court of Appeals also acknowledged
that Quasar did not allege the Japan FCN Treaty as a defense, but as "essential background" as to why the
case is not within the scope of title VII. Id.
148. Id. at 392. E visas are also known as treaty trader visas. See supra notes 35-37 and accom-
panying text (discussing treaty trader visas).
149. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392.
150. Id.
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because the expatriates had a special status conferred upon them by the Japan FCN
Treaty.' 5 ' The court's principal concern was to give effect to the Japan FCN Treaty in
general, and to the article VIII(l) "of their choice" provision in particular.'5 2 The court
explained that title VII would nullify the Japan FCN Treaty if discrimination were found
each time a Japanese business chose Japanese citizens as executives.5 3
The Court of Appeals avoided a collision between the Japan FCN Treaty and title VII
by distinguishing national origin from citizenship."M According to the court, title VII
does not forbid discrimination on the basis of citizenship and the Japan FCN Treaty per-
mits it.5 Under the Fortino facts, where the expatriates were precisely those persons
contemplated by the Japan FCN Treaty, Quasar's action must necessarily be construed as
discrimination on the-basis of citizenship, as this was the only way to avoid an FCN treaty
conflict.'56 Thus, under the Seventh Circuit's approach, Japanese businesses could exer-
cise their treaty right to select Japanese citizens as executives without violating title
VII.15
7
The next question addressed by the Seventh Circuit was whether Quasar could
properly invoke the FCN treaty. Using the place-of-incorporation test and reasoning from
Sumitomo, the court acknowledged that Quasar, being a division of a U.S. corporation,
was not a company of Japan and, as such, was not technically covered by the Japan FCN
Treaty. 58 However, the court was again concerned with giving full effect to the FCN
Treaty.5 9 The court reasoned that a judgment that forbids Quasar from giving preferen-
tial treatment to the expatriates would have the same effect on the parent as if the judg-
ment were issued directly against the parent: MEI would not be allowed to exercise its
FCN Treaty rights."6 Therefore, Quasar must be allowed to invoke the treaty rights of
its parent "to prevent the [T]reaty from being set at naught."' 6'
The Seventh Circuit noted that in footnote 19 of Sumitomo, the U.S. Supreme Court
had left open the issue of a subsidiary's invocation of the treaty rights of its parent.1
62
The court distinguished Fortino from Sumitomo: In Sumitomno, there was no contention
that the parent company had dictated its subsidiary's discriminatory conduct;'
63 in
151. Id.
152. Id. at 392-93.
153. Id. at 392. The court rationalized that because citizenship and national origin are highly
correlated in a racially homogeneous nation like Japan, any Japanese business exercising its Japan FCN
Treaty rights would necessarily appear to be a violation of title VII. Id. at 392-93. The Japan FCN Treaty
"right would be empty if the subsidiary could be punished for treating its citizen executives differently from
American executives .... Title VII would be taking back from the Japanese with one hand what the
[T]reaty had given them with the other." Id. at 393.
154. Id. at 393.
155. Id. at 391-92.





161. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
162. Id. See discussion supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing footnote 19).
163. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
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Fortino, MEI had sent its own executives to manage Quasar.' 6  The court based its
conclusion on this distinction.'
65
As if expecting criticism of its opinion, the Seventh Circuit explained that its decision
was not unsympathetic toward Americans because FCN treaty rights are reciprocal.' 66
According to the court, but for the "of their choice" provision of an FCN treaty, there
would be Americans employed abroad at subsidiaries of U.S. corporations who would lose
their jobs to foreign nationals. 67 In the end, the court reversed the district court
decision.'
IV. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
This section discusses the legal ramifications of the Fortino decision. The U.S.
Supreme Court will not have an opportunity to consider the Fortino case because the
parties have settled. 69 Still, Fortino may be analyzed comparatively with Sumitomo and
other decisions to help determine the future of the FCN treaty and title VII controversy.
A. Fortino Gives Japanese-Owned Subsidiaries Incorporated in the United States a
Legal Advantage Not Enjoyed by Domestically Owned Corporations
The Fortino decision allows Japanese-owned corporations to raise the article VIII(l)
"of their choice" provision of the Japan FCN Treaty as a defense to title VII discrimina-
tion claims, which is not a right enjoyed by domestically owned corporations. Clearly,
Fortino grants Japanese-owned subsidiaries incorporated in the United States a legal
advantage not enjoyed by U.S. corporations."' However, this inequity may be the very
reason why Fortino will not be adopted by other circuits.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393-94.
167. Id. The court presented no factual evidence to support this assertion.
168. Id. at 398. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals expressed no opinion as to whether an FCN
Treaty confers a blanket immunity. Id. at 393. Thus, the court did not address whether the Japan FCN
Treaty allows a Japanese company to buy an American company, fire all of its American executives, and
replace them with Japanese citizens, motivated purely by discrimination against Americans on the basis
national origin. Id
169. Piskorski, supra note 11, at 70.
170. See Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393-94 (remarking that although the decision may seem callous toward
Americans, FCN treaty rights are reciprocal). As a result, some commentators have called for Congress to
amend title VII to statutorily overrule Fortino. See Donald D. Jackson, Note, Tilting the Playitg Field:
Japan's Unwarranted Aa'vantage Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Fortino v. Quasar Co., 28 Tx.
INT'L L.J. 391, 412-13 (1993) (calling for immediate action by Congress to amend title VII to remedy the
unwarranted advantage Japanese-owned subsidiaries have over American-owned corporations).
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B. Other Circuits May Decline to Follow Fortino Because of Its Inconsistency with
Sumitomo
The Seventh Circuit contended that the decision does not give Japanese-owned sub-
sidiaries greater rights because the Japan FCN Treaty is reciprocal. 7' From the Fortino
opinion, it is evident that in the Seventh Circuit's view, the purpose of the Japan FCN
Treaty is to ensure that a company can employ whomever it desires to manage and control
its investments in the host country. 7 2
However, this cannot be reconciled with Sumitomo, where the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously determined the intent of the negotiators of the Japan FCN Treaty was to
ensure that enterprises of one nation would be treated equally in the other-not to give
foreign-owned corporations greater rights than domestically owned companies."' More-
over, according to Herman Walker, the chief architect and negotiator of the postwar FCN
treaties for the United States, the purpose of an FCN treaty is "to secure non-
discrimination, or equality of treatment: a sort of 'equal protection of the laws' objec-
tive.' 714 In addition, in Sumitomo, both the U.S. State Department and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan"7 determined from their files regarding the negotiation history
that a Japanese-owned subsidiary incorporated in the United States should not be allowed
to raise the Japan FCN Treaty.
17 6
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Treaty's objective cannot be
squared with Sumitomo and the overwhelming evidence supporting that decision. To be
sure, during the Treaty negotiations, the United States may have insisted on the "of their
choice" provision,'77 but the reason was to secure equal protection of the laws for
American businesses operating in the host nation.
This inconsistency between the Seventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court regarding
the purpose of the Japan FCN Treaty may prevent the adoption of Fortino by other
circuits.
C. The Ninth Circuit Will Probably Have an Opportunity to Decide Whether to
Follow Fortino in the Near Future
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the FCN treaty and title
VII issue. However, based upon Fortino, a number of defendants in title VII suits have
asserted their parents' FCN treaty rights in the district courts in the Ninth Circuit.1
78
171. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393-94.
172. See id. at 393 (stating that a Japanese-owned subsidiary must be allowed to invoke the treaty
rights of its parent to prevent the Japan FCN Treaty "from being set at naught").
173. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1982).
174. Walker, Modent Treaties, supra note 23, at 811.
175. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the office of the government of Japan that is responsible for
the interpretation of the Japan FCN Treaty. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 183.
176. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 183-84.
177. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 394.
178. E.g., Kieran v. Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., No. C-93-20103 RMW (EAI), 1993 WL 262454, at
*34 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 1993); Kocher v. Acer Inc., No. C-93-20132 RMW (PVT), 1993 WL 149077, at *6-7
(N.D. Cal. May 7, 1993); Mackentire v. Ricoh, No. C90-20077 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1992).
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Moreover, at least two cases arising in the district courts of the Ninth Circuit have
seriously considered Fortino.'79
In Kieran v. Samsung Semiconductor, Inc.,' 8° the defendant, a foreign-owned sub-
sidiary incorporated in the United States, claimed its employment decisions were protected
from title VII by an "of their choice" FCN treaty provision. 8' In response, District
Judge Ronald Whyle cited Fortino as carving out "a narrow exception to the general
holding of Sumitomo where the foreign parent company exercises substantial control over
discriminatory employment decision made by the subsidiary.' ' 2 However, the defend-
ant in Kieran had alleged no facts to show that the parent company controlled the subsidi-
ary's employment decisions, and the court ultimately decided that the subsidiary was not
protected by the FCN treaty. 8 3 Significantly, had this court been unwilling to entertain
Fortino, it could easily have cited Spiess' for a contrary proposition.8
Because of the large number of discrimination suits involving foreign subsidi-
aries,1 86 the Ninth Circuit will likely have an opportunity to decide whether to follow
Fortino in the near future.
D. Other Considerations May Prevent Fortino from Being a Favorable Decision for
Japanese-Owned U.S. Subsidiaries
Although Fortirto is generally favorable for Japanese-owned subsidiaries, public rela-
tions concerns as well as economic and tax considerations may dissuade these subsidiaries
from embracing Fortino-type activities.
As shown by the United States' antidiscrimination laws, Americans have generally
determined that discriminatory conduct based on race, gender, or national origin is socially
179. Kieran v. Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., No. C-93-20103 RMW (EAI), 1993 WL 262454, at *3-
4; Kocher v. Acer Inc., No. C-93-20132 RMW (PVT), 1993 WL 149077, at *6-7.
180. 1993 WL 262454 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 1993).
181. Id. at *3.
182. Id. at *4.
183. Id.
184. See discussion supra part II.C.2.a (discussing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Spiess).
185. In Kocher, the foreign-owned subsidiary was not permitted to raise the FCN treaty as a defense to
title VII because the plaintiff was replaced with an American citizen, not an expatriate as in Fortino.
Kocher, 1993 WL 149077, at *7. A district court in the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to address this
issue in Mackentire v. R icoh, No. C90-20077 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1992). In Mackentire, the attorney for the
defendant filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment that relied entirely on Fortino. Treaty May
Kill Claim of Japanese Bias; Discrimination Suit Against Ricoh Hinges on 7th Circuit Ruling Regarding '53
Pact, THE RECORDER, Feb. 20, 1992, at 1. However, the district court dismissed the case on other grounds.
Federal Judge Dismisses Bias Claim Filed by U.S. Citizen Against Japanese Firm, BNA WASH. INSIDER,
Mar. 5, 1992. Kieran and Kocher exemplify a court's willingness to apply the Fortino approach to situa-
tions involving FCN treaties other than the Japan FCN Treaty. Kieran, 1993 WL 262454. at *3 (involving
the U.S.-Korea FCN Treaty); Kocher, 1993 WL 149077, at *7 (involving the U.S.-China (Taiwan) FCN
Treaty).
186. E.g., Mullen. vupra note 13, at 726-58 (discussing employment discrimination at Japanese-owned
subsidiaries): Yates, sup.a note 12 (discussing Congress' concern regarding employment discrimination at
Japanese-owned subsidiaries).
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undesirable in the workplace. 18 7 Consequently, a company is usually unwilling to dis-
close that it has committed discriminatory acts because, among other reasons, it would
lower the public esteem of the company and may make it more difficult for the company
to hire good employees.
However, in Fortino, the parent's assignment of its expatriates and exercise of sub-
stantial control over the subsidiary's discriminatory actions during the workforce reduction
were the very factors that allowed the subsidiary to assert its parent's FCN treaty
rights.'88 In effect, when a foreign parent company confesses to mandating the subsidi-
ary's discriminatory practices, the subsidiary will be allowed to use the "of their choice"
provision as a defense to title VII. As a result, Fortino encourages parent corporations
to carefully document or even publicly disclose their involvement in a discriminatory
action in order to immunize their subsidiaries from discrimination suits brought by dis-
gruntled executive employees.
To be sure, there already has been considerable concern about discriminatory prac-
tices at Japanese-owned subsidiaries. 89 Needless to say, with documented proof from
the Japanese parent or subsidiary of its discriminatory practices, Americans will have a
basis for their outrage. This will have an impact on the reputation of Japanese companies
and will likely result in decreased sales of Japanese-made goods. Therefore, Japanese
companies have an economic incentive not to exercise their Japan FCN Treaty rights.
Further, Japanese parent firms may also be unwilling to exercise their Japan FCN
Treaty rights because they may lose the tax advantage enjoyed by incorporating their sub-
sidiaries in the United States."9 Under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, a foreign par-
ent company must file a U.S. federal income tax return and is subject to tax at regular
corporate income tax rates on income "effectively connected" with the conduct of a U.S.
trade or business.'' However, the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty (Japan Tax
Treaty) 9 2 exempts a Japanese parent firm from tax on its business profits as long it has
no "permanent establishment" in the United States.' 93 The Japan Tax Treaty provides
that a subsidiary incorporated in the United States does not, in itself, create a permanent
establishment of the parent firm. 94
However, Fortino-type activities-parents assigning their expatriates to manage their
subsidiaries-may be sufficient to create a permanent establishment for the parent firm
within the meaning of U.S. income tax law.'95 As a result, the Japanese parent
engaging in Fortino-type activities would be subject to U.S. federal income tax on the
187. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1993). In addition, nearly all states have similar statutes prohibiting
discrimination.
188. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991).
189. Yates, supra note 12. See also Mullen, supra note 13, at 725-58.
190. Paparelli et al., supra note 50, at 1060-65 (describing possible adverse U.S. federal income tax
consequences if a foreign parent corporation exercises its FCN treaty rights and assigns executive employees
to its subsidiary in the United States to perform business-related activities).
191. 26 U.S.C. § 882(a)(1) (1993); id. §§ 864(b)-(c).
192. U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 8, 1971,
U.S.-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 967.
193. Id. art. 8, para. 1.
194. See id. art. 9, para. 6.
195. Paparelli et al., supra note 50, at 1065.
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income attributable to that U.S. permanent establishment. 9 6 Furthermore, the Japanese
parent would be required to file U.S. federal income tax returns, divulging potentially
sensitive information.
For these reasons, Fortino may not be- as significant a decision for American
employees as would seem at first glance.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
At least one commentator has suggested that Congress amend title VII to expressly
override the Japan :FCN Treaty. 97 However, this approach is not warranted; instead,
any action Congress may take should preserve the intention of the parties to the Treaty.
Congress may have the power to statutorily overturn the Fortino decision, thereby disal-
lowing the use of an FCN treaty within the jurisdiction of the United States,'98 but doing
so will not affect the validity of the treaty for purposes of international law.'
The world is on the eve of becoming a great transnational community and the United
States no longer has the bargaining clout it enjoyed in the 1950s. By not upholding its
end of a treaty, the United States will diminish its reputation and invite criticism from
around the world. Other nations would have reason to be suspicious of the United States
during treaty negotiations. Any action by Congress may compromise the integrity of the
United States in the international community. A better approach would be for the govern-
ments of the United States and Japan to negotiate amendments to the Japan FCN Treaty
clarifying article VIII(I). However, since Congress has not taken any action and no nego-
tiations are planned, the judiciary will probably have the first opportunity to address the
controversy between the FCN treaty and title VII.
Although the parties in Fortino have settled,200 the U.S. Supreme Court will proba-
bly have an opportunity to consider the conflict between title VII and article VIII(l) in
196. Id. at 1060. U.S. tax authorities have been scrutinizing the activities at foreign-owned corpora-
tions and the practice of assigning expatriates from the parent to the subsidiary for this very purpose. Id.
197. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 170, at 412 (concluding that immediate action by Congress is
necessary to avoid the Fortino decision's inequitable result and to respond to the growing popular sentiment
in America that Japan is unfairly exploiting the United States).
198. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (providing that when a treaty and
federal legislation relate to the same subject matter, courts should endeavor to construe them so as to give
effect to both if possible. without violating the language of either, but when the two are inconsistent, the one
last in date will control the other). See also Note, Judicial Enforcement of hIternational Law Against the
Federal and State Governments, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1269, 1286 (1991) (noting that "[uinlike federal stat-
utes, which may be repealed only through the normal lawmaking process prescribed in the Constitution,
[treaties] may be drained of [their] domestic applicability by a superseding federal statute").
199. Breaking the provisions of a treaty is a very serious matter that has in the past generated much
tension between nations, sometimes even resulting in war. Realistically, in view of the position of the Japa-
nese government in Sumitomo regarding the Japan FCN Treaty, it is unlikely Japan will be concerned if
Congress amends title VII. However, any modification of title VII would affect FCN treaties with other
nations who may not view the situation in the same way that the Japanese government does. Note that in
Sumitomo, the Court did not express an opinion as to whether its decision could be applied to FCN treaties
with nations other than Japan because there almost certainly would have been a different negotiation history
with each such nation. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 n.12 (1982). See discus-
sion supra part II.C.1 (discussing the Sumitomo decision).
200. Piskorski, supra note 11, at 70.
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the near future because of the numerous discrimination cases brought against foreign-
owned subsidiaries. °' Even if parties would rather settle than request certiorari, a
public interest law firm will probably bring a test case before the Court in order to resolve
the issue because this is such an important area of the law.202
The Sumitomo decision is an excellent example of the analysis the Court will use in
deciding a future Fortino-type case because of the substantial similarity between the facts
in the two cases and that Sumitomo was delivered by a unanimous Court. The Court will
focus primarily on the intent of the parties when they adopted the "of their choice" provi-
sion in the Japan FCN Treaty.2"3 In Sumitomo, the Court concluded that the purpose
of an FCN treaty was to ensure that each nation would treat foreign-owned enterprises and
domestically owned enterprises equally-not to give foreign-owned corporations greater
rights than domestically owned companies. 2°4 The Court should be able to overturn the
Fortino result on this basis alone.
However, the Court could find further that the purpose of the "of their choice" provi-
sion was to prevent unfair discrimination. Herman Walker supported this proposition
when he stated that the purpose of article VIII(l) of the Japan FCN Treaty was "to pre-
vent the imposition of ultra-nationalistic policies with respect to essential executive and
technical personnel., 20 5  The advantage of construing the purpose of the "of their
choice" provision in this fashion is that it will be reconcilable with title VII, which also
has a similar policy of preventing unfair discrimination. Under this approach, the Japan
FCN Treaty will be harmonized with title VII.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress intended title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to end discriminatory
employment practices based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.2 The "of
their choice" provision in the Japan FCN Treaty allows companies of Japan to hire execu-
tive employees of their choice.07 In Sumitomo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that based
upon a place-of-incorporation test, a Japanese-owned subsidiary incorporated in the United
States was not a company of Japan and therefore not entitled to raise the Japan FCN
Treaty as a defense to a title VII discrimination suit.2 s However, in a footnote, the
201. See Yates, supra note 12.
202. Although it may seem unlikely a public interest law firm would bring a test case on behalf of
executive employees, many nonexecutive plaintiffs are affected by the FCN treaty-title VII issue too;
foreign-owned subsidiaries often attempt to claim the "of their choice" provision even in cases were the
plaintiffs are not executives. E.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (involving
American female secretarial employees claiming that the Japanese-owned subsidiary had excluded them from
managerial positions based on their gender and national origin). As a defense, the Japanese-owned subsidi-
ary alleged that the Japan FCN Treaty permitted it to choose executives of their choice. Id. at 179.
203. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 185.
204. Id. at 187-88.
205. Walker, Commercial Treaties, supra note 23, at 386.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1993).
207. Japan FCN Treaty, supra note 5, art. VIII, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
208. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182-83; see id. at 184-85 & n.10.
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In Fortino, a case similar to Sumitomo, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Quasar
was "technically" nct a company of Japan, but permitted Quasar to raise the FCN treaty
rights of its Japanese parent because the parent had dictated Quasar's conduct of prefer-
ring executives of Japanese citizenship.210 The Fortino decision was surprising because
it is the first case to allow a foreign-owned subsidiary incorporated in the United States
to invoke its parent's FCN treaty rights. In the near future, other circuits will probably
have the opportunity to follow or reject Fortino because many defendants are citing
Fortino as persuasive authority in their briefs.
Fortino clearly grants Japanese-owned subsidiaries incorporated in the United States
a legal advantage not enjoyed by domestically owned corporations in the United
States.21' However, in Sumitono, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court said that the pur-
pose of the Japan FCN Treaty was to ensure that enterprises of one nation would be
treated equally in the other-not to give foreign-owned corporations greater rights than
domestically owned companies.1 2 In view of this policy, other circuits may decline to
follow Fortino because of its inconsistency with Sumitomo.
The Fortino decision may not be as favorable a decision for Japanese-owned subsidi-
aries as appears at first glance. One reason is that the decision tends to encourage the
documentation and disclosure of discriminatory employment practices at foreign-owned
subsidiaries because before the subsidiary may invoke its parent's FCN treaty rights, the
subsidiary must show that its parent directed the subsidiary's discriminatory conduct. This
direct evidence of discriminatory conduct at Japanese companies will certainly cause an
uproar among the American public and that company's sales will be directly affected.
Another reason is that the Japanese parent company may lose the tax advantage of incor-
porating its subsidiary in the United States and be required to file a U.S. federal income
tax return. Therefore, despite the Fortino decision, Japanese parent companies will have
other factors to consider when it prefers expatriates over American executive employees.
Some have suggested that Congress amend title VII to statutorily overturn Fortino.
However, this approach is not advisable because of probable negative consequences to the
United States from the transnational community. A better approach would be for the
United States and Japan to negotiate a modification of the Japan FCN Treaty. Further,
if the U.S. Supreme Court has the opportunity to address the issue, the Court should find
that the policy behind the Japan FCN Treaty was to prevent unfair discrimination, which
would enable article VIII(l) to be construed consistently with the policy of title VII.
In conclusion, the "of their choice" provision of the Japan FCN Treaty and title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will not be resolved short of future legislation, litigation,
or negotiations between the governments of the United States and Japan. Until then,
209. Id. at 189 n.19.
210. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991).
211. See id. at 393-94. See also discussion supra part V.A (concluding that Forino gives Japanese-
owned subsidiaries a legal advantage not enjoyed by domestically owned corporations).
212. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 187-88.
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Japanese-owned subsidiaries incorporated in the United States will have an additional
defense in discrimination cases.
Melvin D. Chan

